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Abstract 
During March 2015, Professor Anne Phillips of the London School of Economics was 
a visiting fellow at Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS). On 13 March a 
group of nine gender scholars from different disciplines held a one-day workshop to 
explore the notion of multiculturalism with her. At the end of the workshop it was 
suggested that Gender Questions should conduct an electronic interview with Professor 
Phillips and that the scholars who attended the workshop would write responses to the 
interview. What follows are the interview with Professor Phillips and responses from 
four of the gender scholars who attended: Professor Amanda Gouws (Political Science, 
Stellenbosch University) Professor Desiree Lewis (Women’s and Gender Studies, 
University of the Western Cape), Professor Louise du Toit (Philosophy, Stellenbosch 
University), and Dr Stella Viljoen (Fine Arts, Stellenbosch University). The other 
scholars who attended were Professor Shireen Hassim (Political Studies, University of 
the Witwatersrand), Professor Kopano Ratele (Unisa/Medical Research Council), 
Professor Cherryl Walker (Sociology, Stellenbos h University) and Dr Christi van der 
Westhuizen (HUMA, University of Cape Town). 
 
INTERVIEW WITH ANNE PHILLIPS 
Key: Anne Phillips (AP); Deirdre Byrne (DB). 
DB: The title of your 2010 book, Gender and culture, has formed the starting point for 
an engagement at STIAS. Can you tell us why you find it so timely at this historical 
juncture to consider how gender and culture articulate with one another? 
 
AP: You’re right, of course, to point to historical juncture. There is a more timeless answer to 
your question, which might note that gender and culture alike are social constructions, and 
might stress the ways in which all our practices of gender are weighted with cultural 
meaning, and all our practices of culture are heavily gender coded. But my own 
preoccupation is more politically driven. It seems to me inconsistent to be committed to a 
politics that challenges domination and inequality in gender relations, yet remains 
indifferent to all other axes of power, and culture has become one of the sites on which 
unequal power relations are fought out. So I am one of those who assumes a connection 
– some potential shared concerns 
– between a feminist politics challenging gender inequalities and a multicultural politics 
(let’s call it that, for the moment) challenging the monoculturalisms that have represented 
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difference as inferior. But this isn’t, of course, a simple alliance. First, culture is endlessly 
deployed to block movements for gender equality. For example, when countries ratify 
CEDAW (the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women) with ‘reservations’, the reason they most commonly give for refusing to implement 
certain provisions for equality is that they see these as at odds with their culture. Much of 
feminist politics is a struggle against culture, or at least against certain ways of defining and 
imposing culture. 
And then there is the further twist, in contemporary Europe, which is that ideas of gender 
equality and women’s rights are increasingly mobilised – by  people  who  otherwise show 
little sign of caring about these – as means of attacking those who have migrated from 
outside Europe. Gender equality is proclaimed as a core principle of contemporary 
Europe (would that it were!) and the principle is deployed to depict entire ethno-cultural 
groups as patriarchal, oppressive, backward. Women’s rights then becomes the slogan of 
those seeking to abandon any vestiges of multicultural policy: we are told that an excess 
of multiculturalism has shored up the authority of socially conservative cultural leaders 
and sacrificed the rights of women to the preservation of cultures we’d do better without. 
For anyone who thinks, as I do, that there are shared concerns between feminism and 
multiculturalism, this makes for an especially challenging moment. 
 
DB: Staying with your book, it addresses the question of whether a gender 
transformation agenda can accommodate itself to an increasingly multicultural world. Do 
you think that is an accurate summary of one of the book’s central purposes? 
 
AP: I wouldn’t put it quite like that, because it suggests that we had a gender 
transformation agenda fitted for a monocultural world, but now have to adjust it to a 
multicultural one. Certainly, the book is framed by the reality of a world constituted by 
layers of global migration – some voluntary, some much less so – and the importance 
of engaging with cultural difference in ways that neither stereotype people nor assume 
a hierarchy of majority over minority, or ‘modern’ over ‘traditional’. And the imagined 
readership is indeed those committed to gender equality, but struggling to find a way 
through current practices and discourses of culture. I organised a workshop a few years 
ago, with Sawitri Saharso, a colleague from the Netherlands, which brought together 
feminists from various parts of Europe to discuss how tensions between gender equality 
and cultural diversity were playing out in our different countries. It struck me that we 
spent more time analysing the meretricious use of the language of women’s rights by the 
anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalism lobbies, than we did exploring ways 
in which cultural tradition was being invoked, in equally meretricious ways, to limit 
women’s rights. It was hard, that is, to get a balance between these two. We do need to 
contest the cultural stereotyping and challenge the lazy generalisations. But we also 
need to address what are real issues for some women and girls: the bullying of some 
young people into unwanted marriages with supposedly safer – more traditional – 
partners from the parents’ country of origin; the very real risk, for some young girls, of 
genital cutting; the pressures some community leaders exert on women not to leave an 
abusive marriage. If the book has one central purpose, it is to help articulate a strong 
feminist politics that contests the misuse of the language of women’s rights to stereotype 
and attack minority groups, but it does this without abandoning the terrain of gender 
equality. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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DB: Could you explain how you think the quest for gender equity should adapt to 
concerns of cultural relativism? At first sight, it may seem that there is an irreconcilable 
chasm between them, since feminism is striving for equality between men and women 
while inequality is inscribed in many cultures. Is there a way for these two agendas to 
meet? 
 
AP:  I think we have to refuse cultural relativism: we certainly have to refuse it if we take 
it to mean that norms of equality or justice are only relative to the culture in which they 
are formed, and that it is inappropriate to take the norms that emerge within one culture 
as the measure against which to assess the practices of another. Apart from anything else, 
this is such a reification and simplification of culture. It suggests that each ‘culture’ is 
entirely self-consistent – as if all the norms fit neatly together and are happily endorsed by 
everyone in the cultural group – and it gives the impression that cultures grow up in 
total isolation from one another. But even without the poor sociology, that kind of 
cultural relativism is clearly incompatible with a strong politics of gender equality, 
because we know that gender equality has not been the abiding principle of most 
societies, and that shouldn’t stop us striving for it! There is a partial truth, as I see it, in 
cultural relativism, which is that norms are indeed formed in historical context: that 
there are particular moments in which it becomes possible to formulate certain ideas and 
ideals, and that the ones we care most about at present may not then be the last word. 
People didn’t always think equality was an important value, for example, in fact they 
didn’t start thinking this until very recently. So there is a kind of relativity built into the 
development of our norms and values. But I think the problem you are pointing to 
becomes easier to approach when we refuse to attach that relativity to something 
termed ‘culture’. We need to challenge the reifications that understate the diversity 
within what are too often presented as unified cultures, and we need to query the 
exaggerations of difference between cultures. For as long as I can recall thinking about 
these issues, I have reacted against statements about the way different nationalities 
supposedly think and behave: ‘the British’, ‘the French’, ‘the Irish’ – what on earth do 
these lazy generalisations, cutting across all differences of class, gender, age, region, 
everything, actually mean? I find it similarly implausible when people talk about 
‘Muslim culture’ or ‘Chinese culture’ or ‘African culture’. By much the same token – it is 
very much the same sort of thing – I find it deeply implausible when people talk about 
what women and men think and want. We have a lot of resources within feminism for 
thinking about and challenging simplifications – it’s something we have been doing for a 
long time – and that’s the first step in challenging the either/or choice between an 
uncritical universalism and an uncritical relativism. 
 
DB: In the second chapter of the book, you address the interrelated matters of cultural 
relativism, multiculturalism, and their apparently polar opposite, universalism. I have 
heard the discourse of human rights hailed as ‘universal’. Do you think this claim has any 
value? 
 
AP: To me, human rights are very clearly a historically located invention: they come into 
political discourse at a certain point in time, and they become a major focus of political 
action at a certain point in time. Some people think of human rights not so much as 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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invention, but as discovery. From this perspective, we have certain human rights by 
virtue of being human; this is a universal truth, something that has always been true; but 
it took us a while (rather a long while) to realise it. I don’t share this view. I see human 
rights as very much a political claim – a hugely important one, but a claim nonetheless – 
and not to be understood as grounded in any truths about human beings or human 
nature. On this, I’m closer to what I take to be Hannah Arendt’s understanding of human 
rights and human equality as a commitment we make to one another. The term 
‘universal’ still has some relevance here, because it captures something of what I would 
like people to commit themselves to: that we will regard all humans as having these 
human rights. And on that aspect – if I’m claiming these rights for myself, don’t I think 
you are entitled to them too? – I guess I do edge towards a rather universalistic 
position. Certainly, I find it hard to accept that the rights I regard as important to my life 
are somehow unnecessary to yours. Perhaps the way to think of this is to say that there 
are three different meanings of ‘universal’ at work here. There is the universality that 
claims human rights as a universal truth: no, I don’t think rights are like this. There is the 
universality that claims human rights as rights for everyone: yes, if we mean anything at 
all by the notion of human rights, we must surely mean this. And then there is the 
universality that relates to the content we give the rights: here, I’m more open- ended. I 
think the content we put into human rights is constantly changing, being expanded upon, 
politically reworked (including through the very extensive feminist reworkings of 
human rights), and that this is part of what is implied in saying that human rights are a 
political claim. But I find it hard, as I say, to think that the particular rights that matter to 
me are somehow irrelevant to others. 
 
DB: From the chapter I’ve read, the book appears to expand some of the arguments you 
make in your article, also published in 2010, entitled ‘What’s wrong with essentialism?’ 
I see an intellectual intersection here. Do you think feminism should abandon its 
historical allegiance to essentialism in the 21st century, or do you still see a value for what 
Gayatri Spivak calls ‘strategic essentialism’? 
 
AP: I think it’s helpful, here too, to tease out the different things we mean by 
essentialism, because it’s become one of those terms we sometimes employ without really 
thinking what we are objecting to. Generalisation is not the same as stereotype, which is 
not the same, in its turn, as claiming an essential ahistorical core, though these can and 
do bleed into one another in complicated ways. If we think of essentialism as 
naturalising, dehistoricising, claiming some essential core, then we shouldn’t engage in it 
even for strategic reasons. If, alternatively, we regard any generalisation about women or 
gender difference as essentialist, this is not, in my view, something we can hope to avoid. 
In Only paradoxes to offer, Joan Scott makes a comment that has always stuck with me. 
She says (I am paraphrasing here) that the goal of feminism is to eliminate sexual 
difference in politics, but that it has to make its claims on behalf of ‘women’; and to the 
extent that it acts for ‘women’, it then produces the very sexual difference it seeks to 
eliminate. The important part of that comment (for me) is the phrase ‘has to’: this is a 
tension built into the politics, or, as Scott says elsewhere, it is feminism’s constitutive 
paradox. So while I think we should continue to contest essentialisms – of gender and 
of culture – wherever we encounter them, there are certain purifications of language and 
politics that are just not available to us. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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DB: One of the problems feminism would like to avoid is the one Gayatri Spivak identified 
in her 1988 essay, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, in which she correctly criticises white 
academics speaking for brown women. Do you think the academy has managed to move 
away from this habit in the past 27 years? 
 
AP: I tend to think of it as one of the founding principles of the contemporary 
women’s movement that it challenged the notion that others can speak for us, and once 
that’s in the lexicon, it has to go all the way: so it is not just that men cannot be left to speak 
for women, but that middle-class women cannot be left to speak for working-class women, 
heterosexual women for lesbian women, white women for brown women, and so on. But 
there is a fine line between speaking for and speaking about, and when we insist upon 
speaking about – as I do, for example, when I speak about problems faced by ethnic 
minority women in Europe, which are not, directly, my problems – we don’t always get the 
line between these two right. So I wouldn’t confidently claim, of myself or the academy 
generally, that we have managed to move away from this habit. The only way you could be 
sure never to slip from speaking ‘about’ to speaking ‘for’ would be never to do the first, 
and that would leave us trapped in our narrow preoccupations. As with the problem of 
essentialism, there are some risks it is almost impossible to avoid, so it is more a matter 
of continual effort, self-awareness and willingness to listen to criticism than any possible 
guarantee. 
 
DB: The difficult intersection between feminism and respect for cultural difference, which 
you have identified in Gender and culture, is also found in the South African experience. 
Would you like to say a few words about our context (for example, about how South 
African feminists could approach these matters)? 
 
AP: One obvious area of difference is that there is nowhere in contemporary Europe 
that practises significant forms of legal pluralism, or gives significant recognition to 
versions of customary law, so the particular ways in which gender equality and respect for 
cultural difference articulate – and can come into tension – in South Africa don’t arise in 
the same way in Europe. Beyond that contrast, there is a very similar set of issues about 
how one is to understand claims made on behalf of culture, tradition or custom, and 
whether a sufficiently de-essentialised understanding of culture, in which women can 
become norms-creators as well as norms-carriers, can open up a more promising space 
beyond the starker opposition between either culture or rights. Theoretically as well as 
pragmatically, I tend to favour transformations from within – the kind of developments 
talked about in South Africa under the rubric of ‘living customary law’ – but I am 
somewhat pessimistic about the actual scope for internal contestation when the authority 
of those who currently ‘speak for’ the culture is opposed to this. I think there are many 
contexts, therefore, in which one has to rely more on the equality rights enshrined in the 
constitution – but that’s hardly for me to say. 
 
DB: Please explain what you mean by multiculturalism without culture. Would 
cosmopolitanism meet this ideal of multiculturalism without culture? 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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AP: As you will have gathered from what I have said so far, I am critical of the ways 
we (this is ‘we’ in Europe) have come to talk about cultures and cultural traditions, and 
in particular, the way in which what is often a very contested activity is misrepresented as 
if it were slavishly followed by all those associated with a particular cultural group (as 
when people talk of ‘honour killing’, for example, as if it were a cultural tradition). All of 
us are shaped by our cultural context and influences, but all of us are also individuals, 
sometimes embracing these influences, sometimes rejecting them, sometimes not even 
noticing they are there. In many ways, I would prefer us to stop talking about cultures 
(as if there are ‘things’ called cultures) and just talk about cultural influences or cultural 
meanings. So why 
do I say multiculturalism without culture? Why not cosmopolitanism instead? My reasons 
 
contingencies of a Europe where rejecting multiculturalism has become associated either 
with a barely disguised rejection of immigration and nostalgia for racial purity, or with an 
arrogant assimilationism that sees no reason why the majority should ever question its 
own values, and regards itself as already the repository of the truth. I don’t want to ally 
myself with those who would potentially be my allies if I join the more wholehearted 
critique of multiculturalism. But I also have my reservations about cosmopolitanism, 
which I still see as marked by a modernising hierarchy and never quite able to throw 
this off, no matter how much today’s cosmopolitans redefine themselves as ‘rooted’ 
cosmopolitans, or insist on their openness to culture. But I confess that I have recently 
written an essay entitled ‘A reluctant cosmopolitan’, so clearly this is something on which 
my mind is not yet made up! 
 
DB: Thank you very much for your time and for the answers to the questions. I would like to 
wish you an enjoyable and successful rest of your stay in South Africa. 
 
A RESPONSE TO ANNE PHILLIPS 
 
Amanda Gouws 
 
In Gender and culture (2010, 18), Anne Phillips rejects the idea of cultural relativism in 
the face of a strong feminist discourse of gender equality and rights, pointing out that 
feminists have been sensitive to the dangers of elevating cultural understandings to 
unquestioned norms and to how cultural understandings shape what are presented as 
universal principles of justice and truth. She also warns us in her response above to 
beware of essentialism that is naturalising, dehistoricising, and claiming some essential 
core. 
 
In order to grapple with multiculturalism we need to consider the production of 
cultural identity and understand the conflicts of power around identity production 
(Scott 1995, 8). In postcolonial, postapartheid South Africa, racialised identities were 
constructed hierarchically for the purposes of rule, so that cultural differences caused by 
race/ethnicity can be viewed in terms of a hierarchy rather than cultural variation, as 
noted by Phillips.1 
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While cultural identities in South Africa have become more fluid since the democratic 
transition, the essentialism of the apartheid racial categories remains intact, even post-
transition (in order to track the success of affirmative action), so that race still assumes 
a hierarchy of the modern over the traditional, and the privileged over the disadvantaged. 
In this regard the essentialism of racial identities remains naturalising, dehistoricising 
and ahistorical, obscuring processes of discrimination that produced these identities in 
the first place, or how the superiority or universality of some over the inferiority or 
particularity of others was established (Scott 1995, 5). 
 
Joan Scott (1995, 6) writes about identity/culture in pluralist societies as ‘the 
referential sign of a fixed set of customs, practices and meanings, an enduring heritage, a 
readily identifiable sociological category, a set of shared traits and/or experiences’, where 
diversity is viewed as a plurality of identities, assuming a level political playing field in a 
democratic system. Our understanding of how these identities should be recognised 
depends on the universal against which the particularity of groups is measured. Or, as 
Balibar (1995, 174) puts it, cultures (or cultural identity) can only be thought of in their 
social diversity in comparison with universals (see also Du Toit 2014). In the South 
African case, colonisation and apartheid produced the discrimination that established 
white racial identity/white culture as the universal. 
 
The objective conditions as well as the subjectivity of the lived experience of 
racialisation and racism under apartheid were replaced after 1994 with individualism 
and individual claims to universal human rights as core aspects of a liberal democratic 
ideology. The abstract character of liberal political membership and the ideological 
naturalised character of liberal individualism work against politicised identity formation – 
they work to prevent, as Brown (1995, 203–205) puts it, the recognition or articulation of 
differences as political. As Brown argues, liberal discourse continuously recolonises 
political identity as political interest and converts political identity into essentialised 
private interest. It therefore subjects claims by cultural groups to the interests of 
individuals, in a way that makes individuals believe that their claims to rights will be 
protected, even if such rights are undermined by intragroup discriminatory practices. 
 
The way cultures treat women has become the marker of how liberal or illiberal they are, 
and gender equality is viewed as a liberal universal value against which women’s 
treatment is measured. Cultural relativism therefore cannot be accepted, since it means 
that different cultural groups or communities have varying norms for gender justice, and 
these norms are not formulated under conditions of gender equality, as Phillips argues. 
Phillips’ solution for multicultural dilemmas (where cultural groups curtail or prevent 
gender equality) is multiculturalism without groups (or without culture) or the 
recognition of the rights of the individual, rather than those of groups: ‘[T]he rights that 
matter in developing a case for multiculturalism are those of individuals, not groups’ 
(Phillips 2007, 162–165). She supports multiculturalism without the reified notion of 
culture or homogeneous conceptions of cultural groups, and suggests that solutions to 
multicultural dilemmas are to be found through discussion and dialogue. 
 
While these solutions to multicultural dilemmas cannot be faulted, the idea of 
individuals’ rights taking priority over group rights begs the question: How is this 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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different from liberalism’s notion of the accommodation of individuals, where individual 
rights trump group rights? Maybe Phillips’ solution is more realistic in European 
societies dealing with the influx of migrants, but how does it propose a solution to the 
postcolonial society, where liberalism’s solution, constructed as the ‘privatised interest’ of 
the individual, is always suspect when measured against the constructed universal of race 
identity? And where ‘righting’ historical wrongs means that there is a competition for 
upward mobility on the racial totem pole (or hierarchy) by different race groups to 
establish hegemony, even if it means individuals may have to sacrifice their rights 
claims? 
 
Phillips’ argument that the rights of the individual need to be prioritised confirms that 
human rights are indeed universal and trump cultural norms, yet she reminds us at 
the same time that even universal rights are always contextual or contextually 
constructed. This seems to be a contradiction. 
 
Phillips suggests mechanisms to make possible the enforcements of rights for 
individuals as members of groups. In the South African case, a plural legal system has 
been established to enable constitutional law and customary law to exist side by side. Yet 
despite these measures, women often cannot exit their cultural groups or do not have 
individual autonomy to claim rights. 
 
Even though gender equality in South Africa is constitutionally enshrined, gender 
equality claims are often subordinated to claims for racial justice. Shireen Hassim has 
shown, in her analysis of Brett Murray’s painting (The Spear), showing President Zuma 
with his genitals exposed, that a gendered interpretation of the painting is trumped by a 
racialised defence of the president’s dignity. This defence challenges the reinscription of 
a ‘white gaze’ on a black body. It masks an understanding of virility and entitlement to 
women’s bodies as a marker of power. A contrary analysis by feminists about the 
violence inflicted on women’s bodies by powerful men will open them up to charges of 
racism and being un-African. 
 
How do the mechanisms of a strong constitution, a very progressive Bill of Rights and 
access to civil courts protect black African lesbian women, when the Leader of the Council 
for Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) says in parliament that ‘being 
gay is unAfrican’ and opens up real possibilities of ‘corrective rape’ for black lesbian 
women? The extent to which the individual rights of women living under customary law 
are realised in deeply patriarchal cultural groups is tightly bound up with the degree of 
‘progressiveness’ of the specific traditional leader under whose rule they reside. Conflict 
between culture and rights often can only be resolved through the coercive 
mechanisms of the state. It is therefore a fair question to ask whether it is at all 
possible for women in these conditions to become norms-creators as well as norms-
carriers who can open up a more promising space beyond the opposition between culture 
and rights, as Phillips suggests. 
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REFLECTIONS ON MULTICULTURALISM AND GENDER- RELATED 
STRUGGLES 
 
Desiree Lewis 
 
Introduction 
Contemporary feminist scholars and activists acknowledge that conceptualising power 
and resistance in the present day needs to take into account the diffuseness, complexity 
and contradictoriness of both dominant and oppressive political systems and struggle for 
democracy. This challenge becomes particularly evident in the face of the deluge of 
digitised and print images that engulf our cognitive landscape and often provide 
authoritative frames for us to make sense of the world. In a context where struggles 
around gender, class and race are often represented visually – on the internet and in 
newspaper images, for example – both dominant and subordinate groups’ struggles for 
legitimacy or recognition often revolve around how forcefully they imagine these. 
 
Claims to authority or struggles around diversity, difference and inequality are often 
interpreted in ways that suit the vantage points of those who claim to fight for ‘justice’, for 
‘recognition’ or for ‘democracy’. Consequently, struggles conveyed through visual texts and 
digitally circulated information (for example, press and documentary photographs or 
films) powerfully shape our sense of what is truly democratic. 
 
I show, in the argument that follows, that multiculturalism provides a powerful lens 
through which conflict and difference can be visually interpreted and framed, rather 
than objectively ‘captured’. Through this discussion, I raise concerns about the pitfalls of 
multiculturalism in explaining struggles for gender and sexual justice vis-à- vis 
intersecting power relations, including neo-imperialism, neoliberalism and global 
capitalism. 
 
Multiculturalism in South Africa and elsewhere 
Multiculturalism is not a term that many South African feminist scholars or activists 
generally use. Rarely do scholars or activists invoke ‘multiculturalism’ to explain 
identity politics or racialised struggles, or to propose solutions to these. The situation is 
strikingly different in the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe. 
Here, the so-called War on Terror and fears of radical Islam seem to have animated 
debates about multiculturalism in distinctive ways. Many conservatives2 believe that 
multiculturalism, defined as the idea of culturally diverse groups coexisting in non- 
conflictual and mutually respectful ways – does not work. According to these pessimists, 
certain non-Western cultures, which are perceived as atavistic and static, routinely 
countenance gender and sexual oppression in the name of the collective. In so doing, 
they violate the individual’s rights to freedom of choice, and their ‘cultures’ are believed to 
be innately out of sync with Western liberal democracy. 
 
In the face of this stereotyping of ‘third-world cultures’, progressives have sought to 
revitalise multiculturalism without falling into the trap of endorsing a form of relativism 
that jettisons shared accountability for global political struggles. Anne Phillips’ writing on 
multiculturalism (2007) exemplifies this progressive trend. On the one hand, it seeks 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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to avoid universalising any one group’s experiences, and on the other, it remains 
committed to fighting injustices globally. Phillips’ confidence in multiculturalism, 
therefore, reflects her ongoing commitment to broad-based and transnational struggles 
for  democracy  that  acknowledge  inequalities  and  differences  within  coalitions  of 
feminists and other progressives (see Phillips 1998). 
 
While I find this confidence and commitment enormously inspiring, I am troubled 
by the political repercussions of the turn to multiculturalism as well as by the way this 
term has travelled and been mobilised. In particular, I feel uncomfortable with the way 
‘multiculturalism’ lends itself to homogenising social struggles, rather than to the kind of 
auto-reflexivity and dialogue that open up radical questions about power and injustice, 
and therefore also radical quests for freedoms. 
 
Chandra Mohanty (2003, 196) hones in sharply on one facet of the politics of 
multiculturalism by situating it in what she calls the ‘“race industry”… an industry that 
is responsible for the management, commodification, and domestication of race on 
American campuses’. Mohanty argues that one problem with the solutions proposed by 
advocates of multiculturalism is that their reasons derive primarily from individual 
psychology, from how individuals are exhorted to understand one another; in the process of 
elevating individual behavioural solutions, the structural and systemic foundations of 
power and conflict are blurred. Mohanty shows, therefore, that the preoccupation with 
people’s attitudinal change is symptomatic of a degree of inattention to the deeper political 
and historical dynamics that create and reproduce differences, and also shape conflicts 
and struggles around such differences. 
 
This is evident in the managerial dimensions of multiculturalism, which imply that a 
certain degree of cohesiveness within the collective has somehow been disturbed by the 
arrival or presence of people belonging to other cultures. The resulting multiculturalism 
then has to be managed. Multiculturalism has therefore thrived in northern contexts, 
where the presence of minorities and immigrants is seen to require practical and 
conceptual strategies for these groups’ incorporation. The view of regulated incorporation, 
of the fundamental normativeness of the ‘central’ or ‘original’ collective, seems to haunt 
even the most radical efforts to avoid universalism. In other words, the central collective 
becomes the custodian of ‘human’ rights. Even when these human rights are 
questioned and adapted, they remain locked into a framework in which a ‘centre’ 
manages peripheries. 
 
For example, when Phillips proposes a form of universalism that will be sensitive to 
difference, she argues that, despite the fact that powerful groups inevitably dominate the 
formulation of democratic principles, ‘both principles and policies should be worked out 
with the fullest possible involvement of all relevant groups’ (Phillips 2002, 31). This 
argument tends to flatten and simplify both power and struggle. It ignores, for example, 
the power embedded in dominant discourses of freedom (as in Western neoliberal 
democracy), questions of hegemony in the formation of ostensibly subaltern oppositions, 
and the unevenness of subjectivity formation in political action and consciousness. Far 
from seeing these dynamics as insurmountable obstacles to global justice, it becomes 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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important to acknowledge these squarely, as feminists like Mohanty or Nira Yuval-Davis 
have done, in order to deepen our engagement with democratic 
goals and struggles. 
 
Generally, then, presenting ‘a case for multiculturalism’ slips into countenancing 
certain rights, and shifts away from thinking about freedom, justice and social 
transformation in more auto-reflexive and radical ways that resist assimilationism. I 
firmly believe that this radical project need not lead to endless relativism or the 
postponement of action, but can be pursued in terms of what some feminists have 
defined as transversal politics (Yuval-Davis) or transnational politics (Mohanty). 
 
Another and related reason for my unease, is how multiculturalism seems to 
naturalise the effects or symptoms of struggles, injustices and social inequalities (for 
example, blacks in Britain, migrants in Canada and an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism 
in the Middle East) as though this is simply the way societies are. Mahmood Mamdani’s 
(2004, 17–62) discussion of ‘culture talk’ conveys my position here. Mamdani argues 
that the ascendancy and rapid politicisation of the term ‘culture’ after the Cold War 
involves explaining historical and political processes according to that category. 
Likewise, the erasure of complex histories and politics, and the normalising of ‘the way 
things are’, go hand in glove with homogenising yet compelling calls to act in ‘the 
interest of human good’. Far from being defined as an exercise of sovereignty, this acting 
for the human good is often imagined as rescue, a case of the collective logically 
establishing norms of justice and freedom for all. Focusing on ‘culture’ therefore shuts 
down on the possibilities of thinking rigorously and radically about how power actually 
works – through history, dominant discourses, subjectivity and hegemony. As I signal 
below, visuality offers an influential medium through which we can interrogate this 
deeper functioning of power. 
 
Managing conflict visually 
A range of work on photographic representations of racial and cultural difference 
shows how influentially an anthropological gaze operates as an apparatus of power. 
Photographs and documentary films of culturally coded others have fixated on their 
exoticism and strangeness. In so doing, they confirm others’ diametric ‘strangeness’ and 
the normalcy of the viewer and the vantage point of the ‘culture that looks’. 
 
It seems to me that many recent flows of knowledge and information about gender and 
sexual justice perpetuate this binary. Compelling calls to act in the interest of human good 
have been conveyed through, for example, photographs of sexual minorities circulated 
by Reuters, in documentary films, or in images in blog posts and websites. These photos 
– whether realistic or obviously posed – have a strong affective function. Although many 
seem to rely on viewers’ innate sense of what is moral and humane, they elicit strongly 
emotional responses by drawing on entrenched discourses and an archive of meanings 
about culture that precede them. Images that seem to call on viewers’ innate sense of 
right and wrong rely on discursive constructions that, when we clearly articulate them, 
are extremely troubling. In particular, by reproducing print, digitised and documentary 
images of culturally defined ‘other’ women and sexual minorities as those in need of 
rescue, these images ossify notions of culture and multiculturalism as neutral, rather 
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than as symptomatic or constructed frames for making sense of power. These 
narratives are not the crude celebrations of Western-centric feminism and 
demonstrations of sovereignty that feminists such as Mohanty (2008) critiqued several 
decades ago. But they flood the global imaginary as persuasive indices of the collective, 
global good. And the forms they often take – especially in photographs circulated by 
international news agencies, on websites, in newspapers or in magazines, effectively 
drown out other ways of imagining freedom and justice and persuade us that they are 
general truths. 
 
One example of the production of a geopolitical collective that has been defined as the 
custodian of ‘multicultural’ good, is the way South Africa has been imagined and 
portrayed as a refuge for gender-non-conforming people and sexual minorities. In 
similar ways to the invention of Israel as a gay haven of sexual rights and gender justice 
in the Middle East (see Schuman 2011), South Africa has been branded as a regional 
geopolitical sanctuary in relation to other African countries, whose laws often criminalise 
homosexuality and gender-non-conformity. 
 
The photograph below, from an NGO focusing on the rights of asylum seekers, in many 
ways illustrates the country’s role as a regional sanctuary. Typical of the visual 
imagination of South Africa’s rights-based freedoms vis-à-vis African countries to the 
north, it conveys a festive sense of cultural inclusion around the annual gay pride march in 
Cape Town. 
 
 
 
Cape Town’s pride parade has been one of several cultural innovations since the 
mid-1990s. These changes have, in some senses, deepened democracy regionally by 
ensuring that ‘all cultures’ participate in the celebration of sexual rights associated with 
Africa’s ‘gay capital’. Yet Cape Town’s pride march also celebrates the leisure, sexual and 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
13 
 
psychosocial needs of privileged and mainly white South African and foreign gays. The 
print and online marketing of the parade reinforces its appeal as an event for pleasure 
and leisure among wealthy gays, with this lifestyle being clearly celebrated (see Figure 
1). It is worth noting that the leisure economy constructed around privileged gay 
consumption and pleasure in Cape Town is huge. On the one hand, heterosexual capital 
has seized on the idea of the limitlessness of pink money and consumption. On the other, 
the resources, infrastructure, spaces and information for privileged gays form a vast 
commercial enterprise, since gays are seen to rely on this arsenal to navigate spaces 
generally seen as unsafe, underground and illicit. 
 
South Africa, and in particular Cape Town, can therefore be thought about along lines 
suggested by Jon Binnie and Beverley Skeggs in their discussion of neoliberalism, sexual 
politics and urban policy. Binnie and Skeggs (2006, 32) comment on the branding of 
Manchester in the UK as a gay village, a post-industrial leisure idyll where ‘freedom for 
gays and lesbians with buying power is central to national economic growth and 
capitalism’. As Figure 1 indicates, many images and messages about South Africa’s 
sexual rights culture therefore direct the promise of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
and intersex (LGBTI) aspirations and freedoms at socially privileged gays and lesbians. 
Such privileges include gay-friendly urban planning in designated areas, capital 
investment in the provision of leisure sites and opportunities, secure and well-policed 
living spaces, infrastructure, and information for guaranteeing physical security and 
personal well-being. All of these ensure rights to sexual freedom, privacy, pleasure, 
leisure and security for gays with buying power. 
 
These rights are most definitely not realisable for many LGBTI immigrants from other 
countries seeking asylum, or poor gays and lesbians, including many living in Cape 
Town’s townships. For these gay people, rights to pleasure, leisure and security are 
heavily circumscribed by financial deprivation, and often by racial discrimination as well. 
In fact, facilities such as shelters for gays and lesbians, and gay-friendly community or 
health centres are resources which neither municipal nor national government, let alone 
capital, is prepared to finance. Maybe even more important than middle-class gay 
privileges not being accessible to the majority of South Africa’s gays and lesbians, is the fact 
that these rights may not constitute definitive freedoms for these groups. The refuge that 
South Africa offers is therefore an assimilationist one. It offers ‘other’ LGBTI people the 
right to belong on its terms, reducing all LGBTI struggles and activism simply to the quest 
for equality in a world that straight, white and middle-class people have. 
 
The neoliberal underpinnings of many claims to rescue those who come ‘from the 
peripheries’ in multicultural societies are fairly obvious in actions, or when described in 
words. In a world of proliferating information, photographs and other visual messages 
play an extremely important role in what Foucault defines as governmentality. As 
Foucault (2004, 28) puts it, governmentality involves the way that ‘multiple bodies, 
forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are gradually, progressively, actually 
and materially constituted as subjects’. It seems to be this shaping of subjectivities and 
naturalising of our sense of justice that is central to the power of the rescue narratives in 
collectivities – whether national or transnational – that are defined as multicultural. 
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CONCLUSION 
Critiques  of  multiculturalism  have  often  focused  on  the  politics  of  its  origins  in 
managerial and governmental strategy; the role of multiculturalism in progressive politics 
and scholarship on sexual and gender justice seems to be strikingly different. Yet, even 
when multiculturalism promises to deepen democratic struggles and our understanding of 
these, it can hierarchise geopolitical identities in insidiously seductive ways. Visual 
representations of ‘cultures’, ‘cultural difference’, ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘cultural 
inclusion’, which currently play pivotal roles in defining and legitimating democratic 
struggles and freedoms, persuasively naturalise these hierarchised geopolitical identities. 
Waves  of  injustice  based  on  gender  and  sexuality  –  but  also  linked  to  neo- 
imperialism, global capitalism and hegemony – continue to require the concerted global 
political action of scholars and activists. Yet models of multiculturalism are unlikely to 
take us far in unraveling these complex dynamics, and more productive methodological, 
theoretical and conceptual leads are offered by feminists who insist on auto-reflexivity, 
standpoint epistemology, non-assimilationism, and the differential power positions of 
voices that struggle for and lay claims to defining ‘democracy’. 
 
A RESPONSE TO ANNE PHILLIPS 
 
Louise du Toit 
 
Will Kymlicka (1996, 76) describes the concept of a ‘societal culture’, which we 
normally refer to in the context of multiculturalism, as ‘a culture which provides its 
members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including 
social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life’ and ‘encompassing both 
public and private spheres’; such cultures are typically territorially concentrated and 
‘based on a shared language’. The idea that societal cultures must be at least partially 
institutionalised in order to survive – in schools, media, economy and government – is a 
modern idea tied up with the logic of nation-states. To add to the dilemmas created by the 
notion of the nation-state, Kymlicka emphasises that modernisation always involves 
standardisation and the ‘diffusion throughout a society of a common culture, including a 
standardized language, embodied in common economic, political and educational 
institutions’ (ibid, 76). Such standardisation operates both within cultural groups and 
within multicultural nation-states. 
 
Such  standardisation  is  necessary  for  reasons  such  as  the  modern  capitalist 
economy’s need for ‘a mobile, educated, and literate work-force’, the democratic state’s 
‘need for a high level of solidarity’, common identity and common citizenship, as well as 
for the ‘modern commitment to equality of opportunity’ (ibid, 77). These insights are 
valuable in that they help us to see that (i) all human life is always and everywhere 
cultural life; thus typical claims by Western liberals that they are freer from culture 
than non-Westerners, or that they are impossibly free-floating and ‘self-made’, are 
nothing less than a self-deception made possible by the way in which such people’s 
cultures pervade the social institutions that rule their lives (or, inversely, the extent to 
which they have successfully tailored their individual lives to fit into the dominant social 
institutions) and (ii) so-called multicultural claims represent a contestation over the 
cultural identity of the dominant social institutions in a society. 
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Cultural identity and belonging are at the same time the most personal (and 
emotionally charged) of issues and the most political. Kymlicka (ibid, 89) casts light on 
one important reason for the first of these: cultural identification ‘is based on belonging, 
not accomplishment’, which means that cultural identification is much more secure 
than identifications that depend upon achievements or specific interests. This means 
that cultural identity is, in nature and ‘feel’, more similar to being part of a family than to 
being a member of a club or a profession. Cultural identity is thus an important aspect of 
secure (and fairly effortless) belonging, while at the same time one’s self-respect and 
dignity are closely bound up with the ‘esteem in which [one’s] national group is held’ 
(ibid.) – hence the political aspect. Cultural claims are therefore clearly symbolic: they 
demand the basic human good of recognition. At the same time, however, they are 
thoroughly material, since claims for public recognition cannot be divorced from the 
extent to which specific cultures are or are not institutionalised within the nation- state 
which, ultimately, governs all citizens’ lives. In South Africa, for instance, since 1994 we 
have seen a consolidation of the powers of traditional leaders over land and over 
women’s bodies, resulting in a significant growth in control over actual material 
resources.3 Such material success lends renewed credibility to specific (misogynist) 
interpretations of cultural identity, as well as to a renewed interest from individuals to 
align themselves with such groups. Cultural claims are never innocent, since they 
contest the distribution of power. Similarly, when feminists, queers and others contest 
dominant cultural claims and promote alternative interpretations of their traditions, such 
claims equally aim at the redistribution of power – this time not between, but rather 
within, cultural groups. 
 
The ‘especially challenging moment’ Anne Phillips mentions in the interview that 
opens this conversation refers to the opportunistic and disingenuous ‘alliance’, which 
typically non-feminist, Western, capitalist and masculinist elites increasingly attempt 
to forge between the counter-cultural claims of feminists and their own attempt to close 
down altogether the legitimacy of certain multicultural claims made in the face of 
Western homogeneity. She refers in this regard to a European workshop where feminists 
found themselves fighting harder against the cynical Western cooptation of feminism 
than against the anti-feminist cultural claims emanating from non-Western cultural 
groups. The point here is clearly that even while feminists internationally seek ways to 
build solidarity amongst feminists ‘within’ and ‘outside’ the (Western and non- Western) 
cultures being criticised, there should also be an unambiguous rejection of what 
Phillips calls ‘the misuse of the language of women’s rights to stereotype and attack 
minority groups’. Feminism is, as she says, per definition ‘a struggle against culture’, and 
a position or perspective on the world attained through a process of often painful 
defamiliarisation and distantiation from the everyday, pervasive aspects of patriarchy 
within one’s own cultural life. This is so since even feminists have necessarily grown up 
in misogynist cultures. But I would qualify her phrase and say that feminism is per 
definition a struggle against reified interpretations of culture. 
 
On the one hand, then, feminist critiques of dominant misogynist cultural meanings and 
practices must be unashamedly critical, by which I mean that as feminists we should 
systematically employ critical tools of analysis to illuminate the myriad ways in which all 
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cultures and religions tend to favour cultural interpretations of meanings in both 
private and public spaces that serve to justify the exploitation of women’s labour and 
sexuality. Feminists of all cultural groups must work tirelessly to expose the ideological 
(patriarchal) dimensions of dominant cultural claims, wherever they occur. In this 
project, it is especially important for feminists to expose Western cultural beliefs and 
claims as cultural beliefs, rather than as a-historical, objective, universal or naturalised 
truths. Feminists must cooperate across nations and cultures to expose the globally 
dominant cultural claims and counter-claims for what they are: finally devoid of any 
real concern for women’s interests, voices, meanings, values or perspectives. 
 
But if, as I claimed, nobody can finally escape from their cultural horizons, although they 
may be temporarily alienated from them through the cultivation of a critical 
consciousness such as feminism, where then do the resources come from for challenging 
misogynist cultural claims and practices? It seems to me that such resources reside in 
the simple fact that every human being has the capacity to bring meaning and value into 
the world. That is to say that we all have the capacity to create for ourselves a world in 
the material and symbolic senses of the word, even if the only materials for doing so are 
the materials already available in the shared human world. Although we inherit an 
existing and already interpreted world, every human has the inalienable capacity to 
reinterpret, recreate and re-order that world. Hannah Arendt uses the word ‘natality’ to 
point to this capacity for novelty, regeneration and for starting something radically new. 
Each interpretation is radically unstable, and cultures (as Phillips and many others have 
argued) are not coherent wholes, neither are they insular or static. To ‘have’ a culture or to 
belong to a religion thus means, inevitably, to take the responsibility of participating in a 
dynamic process of rethinking anew what one’s culture or religion could possibly mean 
in new circumstances, or viewed from the perspective of marginalised lived realities. 
 
Nevertheless, to accept the historical, dynamic and interpretative nature of cultures 
and religions, and to honour everyone’s capacity to participate in cultural interpretation, to 
open up the space for critical and creative contestation over cultural meaning/s is 
fundamentally at odds with the desire to assert cultures as timeless, universal or absolute, 
with the view to extend cultural elites’ control over resources. The ‘challenging moment’ 
referred to by Phillips entails that feminism has been coopted in the latter struggle, to 
the great detriment of both women and the living cultures they belong to. The strategy 
followed by both the West and the ‘rest’ to couch cultural claims in a-historic terms can 
only lead to the escalation of violent conflict on a global scale. The best antidote to this 
imminent danger is a global alliance in which feminists take as their point of departure 
that feminist men and women from all cultures are a rich resource for informing, 
critiquing, and expanding our understanding of what forms feminist resistance and 
transformation may take, and what a feminist, multicultural world might look like. The 
dynamism, contestation and historicity feminists (should) attribute to all cultural claims 
must also be consistently applied to the feminist tradition and counter-culture itself, so 
that feminist politics can allow maximally for internal diversity and contestation. 
 
CULTURE, COSMOPOLITANISM AND DISTINCTION IN GQ MAGAZINE 
 
Stella Viljoen 
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‘We need a multiculturalism “without culture”: a multiculturalism that can acknowledge 
and respect difference without falling into the determinism and simplification of culture’ 
(Phillips 2007, 30). Anne Phillips’ insistence on ‘multiculturalism without culture’ is a 
preference for a notion of culture that is mediated by individual choice, whether conscious or 
unconscious, private or public. That these choices sometimes occur corporately means 
that the degree of personal agency involved in culture is often unseen, even by the 
subject. ‘I would prefer us to stop talking about cultures (as if there are “things” called 
cultures)’, Phillips says in her interview with Deirdre Byrne, ‘and just talk about cultural 
influences or cultural meanings’. In this brief response to the interview, I hope to consider 
taste as a manifestation of what we call ‘culture’. In particular, my emphasis falls on 
Gentlemen’s Quarterly (or GQ), a glossy men’s magazine that serves as an example of 
taste training for a generation of South African men who are perhaps a little insecure 
about choices of an aesthetic or social kind. 
 
GQ first appeared in 1957 in the United States, but, in its earliest incarnation, was a trade 
publication called Apparel Arts, begun in New York City in 1931. The magazine helped 
retailers to advise male customers on fashion and style, so from its inception was 
focused on perpetuating an aspirational aesthetic, connected to class. It was only in 1983 
that the publication was sold to Condé Nast and rebranded as GQ, a magazine 
that is now published in 19 countries and perpetuates a globalising visual rhetoric and 
male gaze.4  The South African edition was launched in 2000, at a time when South 
Africans were grappling with the visual dimensions of South African-ness and how this 
was to be interpreted on an individual level. I have argued elsewhere that in the 1990s 
amendments to South African public policy (specifically on employment equity) brought a 
far-reaching realisation that change was needed to reform the prejudicial apartheid 
legislation of the past (see Viljoen 2008). Other than an optimistic sense of flux, it is 
difficult to define the tone of the mid- to late 1990s, but it was out of this scene that at least 
three international men’s magazines launched local editions, almost as if to answer the 
collective question of what renewed and refreshed masculinities might emerge from the 
ashes of a seemingly vapid patriarchy. 
 
However progressive a dominant ideal may seem, Phillips reminds us that ‘if you’re 
in a society that contains a diversity of cultures … it’s not appropriate to expect everyone 
to adopt the values, practices, and traditions of the dominant majority group’ (in 
Edmonds and Warburton 2010, 68). Multiple masculinities then need articulation in 
the public sphere and one cannot help but ask how glamour magazines like GQ will 
‘regulate the lives and activities of members in particular ways’ (Phillips 2007, 31). 
Phillips’ stated cosmopolitanism, however ‘reluctant’, probably results from her belief in 
affirming cultural multiplicity on the one hand, and rejecting a too-strong nationalism on 
the other. But what is to be made of ‘distinction’ styled as cosmopolitanism? 
 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 5, 41) asserts that it is the preserve of the privileged classes to be 
able to encounter the world by means of a pure gaze, whilst the underclasses consider 
cultural objects as having to fulfil some sort of function other than appearance. The 
acceptance of the gentrifying mien and aesthetic distinction of glossy magazines like GQ 
by a bourgeoning class of upwardly mobile South African men might be just the sort of 
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symbolic violence Bourdieu argues against. While the magazine provides its readers with 
apparently useful advice on how to dress, date and shop, it does so in the most 
essentialising way, providing no room for DIY articulations of culture or fissures in the 
aspirational norm. As in most women’s magazines, conspicuous consumption is 
promoted as the means by which to attain the gleam of ‘culture’ but in men’s 
magazines like GQ, women form part of the universe of goods that arouse interest in the 
consumer and promote his gaze to that of connoisseur. Here culture is monochrome and 
prescriptive, a glossy vacuum named cosmopolitanism. 
 
Phillips (2007, 31) bemoans the ways in which the project of multiculturalism has led to 
an understanding of cultures as more distinct from one another than they probably are. 
She describes this ironic turn of events as partly responsible for the backlash against 
multiculturalism, highlighting the manner in which particularly ‘non-Western groups 
are [thought to be] driven by their culture or compelled by various dictates to behave in 
particular ways’ (2007, 31).5 It is possible that some of GQ’s success in South Africa can be 
attributed to the leverage it offers readers who wish to cast off the stigma of stereotype 
and ‘culture’ in favour of the invisibility offered by a globalised Western taste. To the 
extent that this is true, GQ, as an instance of culture, is the epitome of bad taste. 
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NOTES 
1. I am using ‘racial culture’ and ‘group culture’ interchangeably here, but it needs to be 
borne in mind that culture in South Africa is constructed by race as well as ethnicity 
(ethnic or linguistic groups). It is analytically very difficult to tease out the difference 
between racial and group culture. 
2. Conservatives here are defined as those in Western neoliberal democracies who 
believe that Western values and political systems are threatened by non-Westerners and 
immigrants seeking to retain or adhere to distinct religious, cultural and political beliefs. 
3. Political scientist Shireen Hassim made this point during a recent workshop on 
culture and gender held at the University of Stellenbosch. 
4. The move towards privilege (in the most literal sense, a higher LSM) is often a move 
toward a political preference for cosmopolitanism, but this persuasion is typically 
visualised by the mainstream media as a set of predictable and homogenising surfaces. 
5. Thus xenophobia may be described as resulting from an ethnic mountain dividing 
different cultural groupings within the underclasses. 
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